Rethinking the Nature of the Firm: The Corporation as a Governance Object by Zumbansen, Peer
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Osgoode Digital Commons
Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy Research Papers, Working Papers, ConferencePapers
Research Report No. 27/2012
Rethinking the Nature of the Firm: The
Corporation as a Governance Object
Peer Zumbansen
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, PZumbansen@osgoode.yorku.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Papers, Working Papers, Conference Papers at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Recommended Citation
Zumbansen, Peer, "Rethinking the Nature of the Firm: The Corporation as a Governance Object" (2012). Comparative Research in Law
& Political Economy. Research Paper No. 27/2012.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe/26
!
!
!
OSGOODE!HALL)LAW)SCHOOL!
Comparative+Research+in+Law+&+Political+Economy+
) RESEARCH)PAPER)SERIES)
!
Research!Paper!No.!27/2012!
Rethinking!the!Nature!of!the!Firm:!!
The!Corporation!as a!Governance Object!
!
Peer)Zumbansen)
35 Seattle Law Review 1269-1298 (2012))
)
)
Editors:)
Peer)Zumbansen)(Osgoode)Hall)Law)School,)Toronto,)Director)Comparative))
Research)in)Law)and)Political)Economy))
John)W.)Cioffi)(University)of)California)at)Riverside))
Leeanne)Footman)(Osgoode)Hall)Law)School,)Toronto,)Production)Editor))
!
!
!
!
!
1269 
Osgoode'CLPE'Research'Paper'27/2012'Vol.'08'No.'06'(2012)'
Peer$Zumbansen$
!
Rethinking$the$Nature$of$the$Firm:$The$Corporation$as$a$
Governance$Object$'
Abstract:) This% Article% attempts% to% bridge% two% discourses—corporate%
governance% and% contract% governance.% Regarding% the% latter,% a% group%of%
scholars%has%recently%set%out%to%develop%a%more%comprehensive%research%
agenda%to%explore%the%governance%dimensions%of%contractual% relations,%
highlighting%the%potential%of%contract%theory%to%develop%a%more%encom>
passing% theory% of% social% and% economic% transactions.%While% a% renewed%
interest%in%the%contribution%of%economic%theory%for%a%concept%of%contract%
governance%drives%one%dimension%of% this%research,%another%part%of% this%
undertaking%has%been%to%move%contract%theory%closer%to%theories%of%so>
cial%organization.%Here,% these% scholars%emphasize% the%“social”%or% “pub>
lic”%nature%of%contracts%to%return%to%a%critical%reflection%on%the%classical%
model%of%one>off,% spot%contracts% for%an%exchange%of%goods%or%services.%
The% inspiration% for% this% enterprise% comes% from% corporate% governance%
debates%over%the%last%two%decades,%which%focused%on%competing%claims%
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of% the% state,% which% domestically% and% transnationally% forms% the% back>
ground% of% the% growing% prominence% of% contract% as% a% governance% tool,%
must%be%seen%as%the%other%dimension%of%a%renewed%interest%in%“govern>
ing%contracts.”%This%article%places%the%corporation%at%the%intersection%of%
these%contentions%by%drawing%out% the%promise%of% rereading% the%nexus>
of>contract%model%of%the%corporation%from%the%perspective%of%relational%
contract%theory.%
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Rethinking the Nature of the Firm: 
The Corporation as a Governance Object 
Peer Zumbansen* 
“It is important to recognize that most organizations are simply le-
gal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relation-
ships among individuals.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article attempts to bridge two discourses—corporate govern-
ance and contract governance. Regarding the latter, a group of scholars 
has recently set out to develop a more comprehensive research agenda to 
explore the governance dimensions of contractual relations, highlighting 
the potential of contract theory to develop a more encompassing theory 
of social and economic transactions.2 While a renewed interest in the 
contribution of economic theory for a concept of contract governance 
drives one dimension of this research, another part of this undertaking 
has been to move contract theory closer to theories of social organiza-
tion. Here, these scholars emphasize the “social” or “public” nature of 
* Professor of Law and Canada Research Chair, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toron-
to; PZumbansen@osgoode.yorku.ca. Article presented at the Berle III Symposium, Seattle Universi-
ty School of Law, January 12–14, 2012, with gratitude for the invitation by Charles O’Kelley and 
the Berle Center and the opportunity to present these ideas and for intriguing comments from the 
conference participants. 
This Article is part of evolving work on a theory of corporate governance in the knowledge socie-
ty. First steps include the following: Peer Zumbansen, The Next “Great Transformation”? The Dou-
ble Movement in Transnational Corporate Governance and Capital Markets Regulation, in THE 
SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS OF TRANSNATIONAL MARKETS (Christian Joerges & Josef Falke eds., 
2011); Peer Zumbansen, The New Embeddedness of the Corporation: Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity in the Knowledge Society, in THE EMBEDDED FIRM: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, LABOUR AND 
FINANCIAL CAPITALISM 119 (Cynthia A. Williams & Peer Zumbansen eds., 2011). Parts of the 
present Article draw on a presentation at the “Contract Governance” Conference in Berlin in 2010, 
convened by Florian Möslein, Karl Riesenhuber and Stefan Grundmann. Thanks to Amar Bhatia, 
Tracey Linstead, and Aviv Pichhadze for valuable feedback, to Money Khoromi and Douglas Sarro 
for excellent research assistance, as well as to David Konkel and Joan Miller at the Seattle Universi-
ty Law Review for their truly outstanding and succinct editorial work on this paper. 
1. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976). 
2. CONTRACT GOVERNANCE (Florian Möslein et al. eds., forthcoming 2012); Florian Möslein
& Karl Riesenhuber, Contract Governance – A Research Agenda, 5 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 248 (2009). 
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contracts to return to a critical reflection on the classical model of one-
off, spot contracts for an exchange of goods or services.3 
The inspiration for this enterprise comes from corporate governance 
debates over the last two decades. These debates focused on competing 
claims of “convergence” versus “divergence” as part of an ambitious 
investigation into universal standards, the “end of history,” and the un-
derlying “varieties of capitalism.”4 Meanwhile, the fundamental trans-
formation of the state, which domestically and transnationally forms the 
background of the growing prominence of contract as a governance tool, 
must be seen as the other dimension of a renewed interest in “governing 
contracts.”5 
Today, half a decade after a long and expanded debate among cor-
porate lawyers and political economists over the convergence or diver-
gence of corporate governance systems, scholars and courts alike have 
moved on to address the pressing regulatory challenges in this field,6 the 
contours of which are now just as blurred as the proverbial “nature” of 
the business enterprise itself.7 This context provides an excellent oppor-
tunity to bring together the “internal” and “external” regulatory perspec-
tives on the corporation. On the “inside,” there is a continuing struggle 
between contractual and organizational depictions of the nature of the 
firm, while on the “outside,” we see a continuing transformation of a 
regulatory framework that is increasingly disembedded from the state. 
An approximation of both perspectives allows us to rethink the nature of 
the corporation as a subject and an object of governance; the concept of 
contract must, however, be expanded in order to contribute to, but not 
alone shoulder, an adequate conceptualization of the complex architec-
ture of the modern corporation.8 Contract, which cannot be studied in 
3. See David Campbell, Reflexivity and Welfarism in the Modern Law of Contract, 20 OXFORD 
J. LEGAL STUD. 477 (2000); John P. Esser, Institutionalizing Industry: The Changing Forms for 
Contract, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 593 (1996). 
4. See VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE
ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001) [hereinafter VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM]; 
Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, in 
CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 128–58 (Jeffrey Gordon & Mark 
Roe eds., 2004). 
5. See generally HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS (1999); PETER VINCENT-JONES,
THE NEW PUBLIC CONTRACTING: REGULATION, RESPONSIVENESS, RELATIONALITY (2006); see also 
Peer Zumbansen, The Law of Society: Governance Through Contract, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL. 
STUD. 191 (2007). 
6. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate Law in a New Gilded Age, 2 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 1 (2008). 
7. Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Walmart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in
Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913 (2007). 
8. While this Article will sketch the historical and theoretical background and suggest the
outlines of a recontractualized concept of the corporation, a future paper will focus more specifically 
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isolation, occurs within the intersecting modes of governance and, as a 
result, provides a crucial element for building a new interdisciplinary 
theory of governance. 
After a cursory historical sketch of the trajectory of corporate law 
theory in Part II, Part III offers contextual evidence for the increased in-
terest among governance and regulation scholars in the area of corporate 
law. Against this background, Part IV presents a more detailed discus-
sion and critique of contractual governance in order to challenge the oth-
erwise oversimplifying appropriation of contract to explain complex 
power relations within and beyond the corporation. Part V considers the 
implications and challenges of the interdisciplinary theoretical analysis 
of corporations in the modern context. Part VI briefly concludes. 
II. STUDYING THE CORPORATION
Beginning a series of reflections on the nature of the firm today 
would require a particular combination of eruditeness and irony that 
prompts a more collective, discursive effort than a singular scholarly un-
dertaking. With our deep scepticism of any attempt to conclusively de-
lineate and re-craft a comprehensive theory, each and every element of 
this theory remains exposed to further contestation and deconstruction. 
Referring to the corporation as an object of study and investigation 
through the lenses of theories of the firm, corporate governance, or con-
tract governance opens up—at best—a vista of a historical and intellec-
tual universe that is in every respect overwhelming. And yet, we are 
drawn to the corporation, to its beginnings9 and its ends,10 investigating 
on the question of the board’s fiduciary duties. It will suggest that an approximation of contract 
theory and corporate governance, with relevant regard to securities regulation, promises insights into 
the long-standing challenges that characterize the corporation as a contractual organization. A se-
cond future paper will further elaborate the contention made here that stakeholder interests can be 
advanced by reformulating the corporate contract—arguably establishing a principal-agent relation-
ship between shareholders and management—as a public contract. In taking issue with two recent 
Canadian Supreme Court rulings involving large-scale corporate change of control transactions, 
Peoples Dep’t Stores, Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461 (Can.) and BCE, Inc. v. 1976 
Debentureholders, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 (Can.), the follow-up paper will explore the (partially lost) 
opportunity of crafting a more adequate theory of the firm by moving beyond the Court’s interest in 
“interests” and its formula of the “good corporate citizen.” Centrally, that paper will draw on rela-
tional contract theory and legal pluralism on the one hand and on “social norms” and evolutionary 
theory on the other to argue for a systemic approach to corporate governance, allowing us to take a 
fresh look at directors’ duties and corporate social responsibility. 
9. See, e.g., WALTHER RATHENAU, VOM AKTIENWESEN [OF THE NATURE OF STOCK
CORPORATIONS] 11 (1918): 
Through its path from the family enterprise and association to the large corporation there 
has occurred a substitution of the foundation of our business associations, their organs 
and forms of governance and administration; but neither science, legislature nor judiciary 
have taken notice of this inner morphing of the grounds of being and of the forms of im-
pact; alone a series of ever recurring conflicts, taken as contingent or arbitrary, have pen-
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them as complex relationships between individual and collective instan-
tiations of power,11 as intricate spheres of organizational design,12 as car-
riers of “public purpose,”13 as sources of knowledge production and 
transformation,14 as demarcations of social spheres and spaces,15 and as 
illustrations of the tension between markets and hierarchies16 or between 
different “stakeholders.”17 Seen from this vista, corporations offer oppor-
tunities to study governance structures, whether or not we still think they 
can be demarcated along the boundaries between an “inside” and an 
“outside.”18 
                                                                                                         
etrated public opinion . . . . The administration of a large corporation exceeds—as con-
cerns scope, personnel structure and impetuous shift of tasks—the government of a small 
state today or that of a large one of one hundred years ago. I would not know of a time 
nor a place on earth, including America, where year in, year out with the same velocity, 
security and responsibility a similar daily stock of executionary and administrative work 
of constructive nature would have been accomplished as is the case in the governing 
echelons of our large corporations. 
Id. (Peer Zumbansen trans.). But see ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 309 (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932) (“[I]t involves a 
concentration of power in the economic field comparable to the concentration of religious power in 
the mediaeval church or of political power in the national state.”). 
 10. See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF 
CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975); see also Dalia Tsuk-Mitchell, The End of Corporate Law, 44 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 703, 729 (2009) (“Having helped to eradicate any meaningful force out of corporate 
law, all that the Delaware courts have left to elaborate at the turn of the twenty-first century are 
ideals they are unwilling to enforce.”). 
 11. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 15 (1954). 
 12. See, e.g., Eric Orts, The Future of Enterprise Organization, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1947 (1998). 
 13. Charlotte Villiers, Corporate Law, Corporate Power and Corporate Social Responsibility, 
in PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 85 (Nina Boeger, Rachel Murray & Char-
lotte Villiers eds., 2008); Peter Cornelius & Bruce Kogut, Creating the Responsible Firm: In Search 
for a New Corporate Governance Paradigm, 4 GERMAN L.J. 45 (2003); Simon Deakin, Squaring the 
Circle? Shareholder Value and Corporate Social Responsibility in the UK, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
976 (2002). 
 14. Cristiano Antonelli, The Evolution of the Industrial Organisation of the Production of 
Knowledge, 23 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 243 (1999); Mary O’Sullivan, The Innovative Enterprise and 
Corporate Governance, 24 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 393 (2000). 
 15. Marina Welker, Damani J. Partridge & Rebecca Hardin, Corporate Lives: New Perspec-
tives on the Social Life of the Corporate Form: An Introduction to Supplement 3, 52 CURRENT 
ANTHROPOLOGY S3 (2011). “[U]nderstanding corporations as social forms, actors embedded in 
complex relations, and entities that produce and undergo transformation, with all the friction that 
entails.” Id. at S4 (citation omitted). 
 16. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. 
ECON. LIT. 1537 (1981). For a critique, see GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 
127–31 (Anne Bankowska & Ruth Adler trans., 1993). 
 17. See Simon Deakin, Workers, Finance and Democracy, in THE FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW: 
LIBER AMICORUM BOB HEPPLE QC 79 (Catherine Barnard et al. eds., 2003); Sanford M. Jacoby, 
Labor and Finance in the United States, in THE EMBEDDED FIRM: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 
LABOUR, AND FINANCE CAPITALISM 277 (Cynthia A. Williams & Peer Zumbansen eds., 2011) 
[hereinafter THE EMBEDDED FIRM]. 
 18. Rejecting the boundary, see Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 311, and Gillian K. Had-
field, Legal Infrastructure and the New Economy, 8 J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 1, 8 (2011) 
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The following observations are inspired by the evolution of the cor-
poration as a focus of investigation among legal scholars, economists, 
sociologists, political scientists, historians, and anthropologists demon-
strating that the corporation, as an academic subject, has long ceased to 
belong to legal scholars alone. It is perhaps only a little less trite to ob-
serve that the same is true for the field of corporate law itself. Theory 
and practice of the field suggest that we must approach and understand 
corporate law not only as a point of conflict between allegedly diametri-
cally opposed “theories of the firm” or between shareholder and stake-
holder conceptions, but also as a vibrant, multilayered regulatory regime. 
A regime characterized by overlapping, intervening, and conditioning 
authorities, nontraditional rule-makers, mixed norms, and new, not ex-
clusively state-based, enforcement and compliance mechanisms. 
The present Article, then, is informed by an interest in corporate 
governance, broadly understood. Such studies today are of an unavoida-
bly interdisciplinary nature, given the multifaceted nature of the corpora-
tion and the resulting concert of interpreting and analyzing disciplines 
that rally around the subject. At the same time, corporate lawyers must 
confront a mix of relatively concrete challenges that arise from the gov-
ernance and operation of the corporation and larger considerations re-
garding the societal status, nature, or responsibility of the corporation. 
The answers to these questions have, over time, contributed to a consid-
erable differentiation and deepening of the field, making the corporation 
an objet trouvé of a very particular kind. In other words, the corporation 
has long been in the center of research that analyzes the governance 
framework and architecture of the corporation, the nature and pressures 
of different interests in and around the corporation, as well as its larger 
place and role in society. 
In more than one way, the current “open-mindedness” of corporate 
law as an intellectual and interdisciplinary undertaking bears some re-
semblance to an earlier period in history roughly a century ago. At that 
time, legal scholars’ work on the corporation displayed a heightened de-
gree of sensitivity to the interplay between the internal governance di-
mensions of the corporation and the evolving normative infrastructure of 
corporate or company law in relation to a fast-unfolding market society.19 
                                                                                                         
(“Fast-paced, global, niche-driven, and increasingly network- rather than firm-based, the economy 
today is poorly served by legal markets and institutions developed to meet the demands generated by 
an economy based on standardized mass-market manufacturing, predominantly domestic, markets, 
and production organized within rather than across firm boundaries.”). 
 19. See ERNST FREUND, THE LEGAL NATURE OF CORPORATIONS (1897); FRANZ KLEIN, DIE 
NEUEREN ENTWICKLUNGEN IN VERFASSUNG UND RECHT DER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT [NEW 
DEVELOPMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND LAW OF THE STOCK CORPORATION] (1904); FRITZ 
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Both legal scholars and economists undertook parallel and increasingly 
discursive and collaborative endeavors, fuelling research on the corpora-
tion and its place in a politically and economically volatile environ-
ment.20 This path of scholarship reignited in intensified fashion in the 
1970s and ’80s. 
Meanwhile, and in contrast to much debate around the growing role 
of corporations on the national and global scale21 from political, histori-
cal, and sociological perspectives, the “law and economics” movement 
spread like “prairie fire” through corporate law academia and law 
schools in general.22 Next came a period of greater interest among corpo-
rate lawyers in market structures, this time allowing for a closer ex-
change between theoretical models and “real world” evidence from vi-
brant and integrating markets.23 In the shadow of the experience of the 
takeover-frenzied 1980s,24 the “Roaring Nineties,”25 and the burgeoning 
exuberance of the “new economy” before its fall,26 corporate governance 
as a field for lawyers, economists, and comparative political economists 
emerged as a truly global research and policy area.27 At a time when 
starting associates in New York, Frankfurt, or Paris were paid premium 
salaries to work on the mergers and acquisitions boom,28 legal scholars 
                                                                                                         
NAPHTALI, WIRTSCHAFTSDEMOKRATIE: IHR WESEN, WEG UND ZIEL [ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY: ITS 
NATURE, PATH AND GOAL] (1928). 
 20. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 9; ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW (1986); MARK J. 
ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE 
FINANCE (1994); Erich Schanze, Potential and Limits of Economic Analysis: The Constitution of the 
Firm, in CONTRACT AND ORGANISATION: LEGAL ANALYSIS IN THE LIGHT OF ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL THEORY 204 (Terence Daintith & Gunther Teubner eds., 1986) [hereinafter CONTRACT AND 
ORGANISATION]; THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (1904); Arman A. 
Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 52 AM. 
ECON. R. 777 (1972); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1. 
 21. Then: JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967); now: NAOMI 
KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM (2007). 
 22. See Brian R. Cheffins, The Trajectory of (Corporate) Law Scholarship, 63 CAMBRIDGE 
L.J. 456 (2004). 
 23. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizing 
the European Corporate Governance Environment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 161 (1992). 
 24. See Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence and Regulation, 9 YALE J. 
ON REG. 119 (1992). 
 25. See JOSEPH STIGLITZ, THE ROARING NINETIES: SEEDS OF DESTRUCTION (2003). 
 26. See DOUG HENWOOD, AFTER THE NEW ECONOMY: THE BINGE . . . AND THE HANGOVER 
THAT WON’T GO AWAY (2003); Ugo Pagano & Maria Alessandra Rossi, The Crash of the 
Knowledge Economy, 33 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 665 (2009). 
 27. For a brilliant overview and analysis of the field, see John W. Cioffi, State of the Art: A 
Review Essay on Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging Research, 
48 AM. J. COMP. L. 501 (2000). 
 28. But see the situation today. Roben Farzad, Law Firms Trim Their Ranks to Boost Profits, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11 
_19/b4227016790130.htm. 
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were touring the global conference circuit to propagate29 or to debate, as 
the case might have been, the triumph of converging corporate govern-
ance systems.30 The ensuing two decades of corporate governance re-
search were particularly vibrant, as legal scholars, economists, sociolo-
gists, and political economists unpacked the distinctions in the historical 
and socio-economic-political trajectories of different corporate law re-
gimes.31 Then came Enron.32 
This collapse confronted corporate governance research with a 
freshly amplified “public” interest in the corporation and its regulation 
not least because accounting practices, interlocked corporate entities, and 
executive compensation had became widely visible newspaper headlines. 
Corporate governance research overall proliferated. Inspired by compara-
tive legal analysis33 and by interdisciplinary research on the “varieties of 
capitalism,” a growing number of corporate governance scholars have 
routinely been collaborating from their home bases in law, management 
studies, corporate social responsibility (CSR), or organizational psychol-
ogy.34 These scholars regularly second-guess the extremely influential 
assertions put forward by a group of scholars who had relied on empiri-
                                                
 29. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 439 (2001); see also Henry Hansmann, How Close is the End of History?, 31 J. CORP. L. 
745 (2006). 
 30. For insightful assessments, see Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of 
“Global” Convergence in Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 321 (2001); Ronald Dore, 
William Lazonick & Mary O’Sullivan, Varieties of Capitalism in the Twentieth Century, 15 OXFORD 
REV. ECON. POL’Y 102 (1999). And with further differentiation, see Ruth V. Aguilera, Kurt A. 
Desender & Luiz Ricardo Kabbach de Castro, A Bundle Perspective to Comparative Corporate 
Governance, in SAGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 379, 391 (Thomas Clarke & 
Douglas Branson eds., 2011). 
 31. See JOHN W. CIOFFI, PUBLIC LAW AND PRIVATE POWER: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN AN AGE OF FINANCE CAPITALISM (2010); David 
Soskice, Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 
1980’s and 1990’s, in CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM 101 (Herbert 
Kitschelt et al. eds., 1999); Sigurt Vitols, Varieties of Corporate Governance: Comparing Germany 
and the UK, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM, supra note 4, at 337; John W. Cioffi, Governing Globali-
zation? The State, Law, and Structural Change in Corporate Governance, 27 J.L. & SOC’Y 572 
(2000); William Lazonick, Varieties of Capitalism and Innovative Enterprise, 24 COMP. SOC. RES. 
21 (2007). 
 32. See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 
1275 (2002); Simon Deakin & Suzanne J. Konzelmann, Learning from Enron, 12 CORP. 
GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 134 (2004). 
 33. For a selection of the positions, see CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, supra note 4, at 128–58; see also Klaus Jürgen Hopt, Comparative Company Law, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1161 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmer-
mann eds., 2006); David C. Donald, Approaching Comparative Company Law, 14 FORDHAM J. 
CORP. & FIN. L. 83 (2008). 
 34. A fitting illustration is given in Ruth Aguilera, Deborah Rupp, Cynthia A. Williams & Jyoti 
Ganapathi, Putting the S Back in Corporate Social Responsibility: A Multi-Level Theory of Social 
Change in Organizations, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 836 (2004). 
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cal studies to ascertain a strong correlation between legal origins, owner-
ship structures, and shareholder rights.35 Scholars in Europe and in North 
America challenged these findings on various fronts and contributed to 
an altogether much more differentiated picture of corporate governance 
regulation.36 
Concurrently, scholars began studying the corporation and its regu-
latory infrastructure from yet another perspective. Their primary interest 
is in the corporation as a hybrid entity, caught between being a subject 
and an object of rule-making.37 This ambivalent nature of the corporation 
lends itself perfectly to what has, in our day, become a multipronged in-
vestigation into the evolving nature of the corporation, as it appears on 
both sides of its artificially constructed boundaries.38 On the “inside,” 
scholars have worked hard to lay bare what makes the corporation “tick” 
so that we may best understand, shape, and influence the roles played by 
various members of the corporate organization.39 On the corporation’s 
“outside,” the picture is just as perplexing: in light of the indisputable 
fact that the corporation remains the dominant force in a globally inte-
grated economy,40 scholars have increasingly directed their attention at 
the complex regulatory and normative landscape in which the corpora-
                                                
 35. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic Conse-
quences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 285 (2008); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); Andrei 
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997). 
 36. Ruth V. Aguilera & Cynthia A. Williams, “Law and Finance”: Inaccurate, Incomplete, 
and Important, 2009 BYU L. REV.1413; Mathias M. Siems & Simon Deakin, Comparative Law and 
Finance: Past, Present and Future Research, 166 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 120 
(2010); Holger Spamann, Contemporary Legal Transplants: Legal Families and the Diffusion of 
(Corporate) Law, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1813. 
 37. See, e.g., Michael Power, Constructing the Responsible Organization: Accounting and 
Environmental Representation, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ECOLOGICAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE 
CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF ECOLOGICAL SELF-ORGANIZATION 369 (Gunther Teubner et al. eds., 
1994); TEUBNER, supra note 16, at 123−58. 
 38. See John Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 
655 (1926). 
 39. See, e.g., MICHEL CROZIER, L’ENTREPRISE A L’ECOUTE: APPRENDRE LE MANAGEMENT 
POST-INDUSTRIEL [THE ENTERPRISE UNDER SCRUTINY: LEARNING POST-INDUSTRIAL 
MANAGEMENT] (Seuil 1994) (1989); JAMES E. POST, LEE E. PRESTON & SYBILLE SACHS, 
REDEFINING THE CORPORATION: STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL WEALTH 
(2002); JOHN ROBERTS, THE MODERN FIRM: ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN FOR PERFORMANCE AND 
GROWTH (2004); Marjolijn S. Dijksterhuis, Frans A. J. Van den Bosch & Henk W. Volberda, Where 
Do New Organizational Forms Come From? Management Logics as a Source of Coevolution, 10 
ORG. SCI. 569 (1999); Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of 
the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233 (2002). 
 40. See Detlev F. Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational 
Law, 83 HARV. L. REV. 739 (1970). 
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tion operates. These studies41 coalesce to sketch a detailed map of the 
interplay between the “hard” and “soft,” “public” and “private” norms 
that shape corporate activities.42 
On the following pages, we gaze inward toward the “inner” life of 
the corporation. The goal of this reorientation is to take a closer look at 
the interaction between two theoretical constructs in the assessment of 
the corporation. One—corporate governance—is merely another frame-
work through which scholars have been studying the organizational de-
sign and power structure of the modern business corporation for some 
time.43 The other is concerned with contract governance and aims at ap-
proximating an already highly differentiated body of work on and around 
contract law to the research done under the corporate governance um-
brella. The hope is that a parallel view and border-crossing engagement 
with both approaches can unlock some of the deadlocks that are inherent 
to each. In order to more fully understand the upsides (and downsides) of 
contract thinking regarding the corporation, it will be helpful to contex-
tualize the present interest in contract governance against the background 
of a fundamental transformation of the regulatory state, which gives rise 
to unfolding processes of decentralization, privatization, and to institu-
tional and normative pluralism.44 These processes raise significant ques-
tions with regard to law as a tool of societal governance, and it is to these 
questions that the article now turns. 
                                                
 41. See, e.g., SUMMARY REPORT: EXPERT MEETING ON CORPORATE LAW AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES OF USING CORPORATE LAW TO ENCOURAGE 
CORPORATIONS TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY 
GENERAL [SRSG] CORPORATE LAW TOOLS PROJECT (2010), available at http://www.valoresoc 
iale.it/detail.asp?c=1&p=0&id=316; David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Human Rights Responsibil-
ities of Business as Non-State Actors, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 315 (Philip Al-
ston ed., 2005); David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human 
Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931 (2004); Gun-
ther Teubner, Self-Constitutionalizing TNCs? On the Linkage of “Private” and “Public” Corporate 
Codes of Conduct, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 617 (2011). 
 42. See Peer Zumbansen, Neither ‘Public’ nor ‘Private,’ ‘National’ nor ‘International’: 
Transnational Corporate Governance from a Legal Pluralist Perspective, 38 J.L. & SOC’Y 50 
(2011). 
 43. See Mark J. Roe, Comparative Corporate Governance, in THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 339–46 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter THE 
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY]. 
 44. For a concise analysis, see Colin Scott, Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of 
the Post Regulatory State, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION: INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY 
REFORMS FOR THE AGE OF GOVERNANCE 145–74 (Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur eds., 2004). 
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III. THE LAWYER’S MINDSET AND THE NEW TWIST IN 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. notes toward the end of his landmark 
essay, The Path of the Law, that “[w]e cannot all be Descartes or Kant, 
but we all want happiness.”45 As students of this text once knew, he con-
tinues to remark: 
And happiness, I am sure from having known many successful men, 
cannot be won simply by being counsel for great corporations and 
having an income of fifty thousand dollars. An intellect great 
enough to win the prize needs other food beside success. The re-
moter and more general aspects of the law are those which give it 
universal interest. It is through them that you not only become a 
great master in your calling, but connect your subject with the uni-
verse and catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its unfathoma-
ble process, a hint of the universal law.46 
There is much in these lines to ponder. Holmes’s essay, throughout, 
reads—and was meant—as a wholehearted assault on dearly held beliefs 
regarding the objective nature of abstract legal principles, the separation 
of law and morality, and the construction of legal rules in following the 
command of logic. Heralded—by none other than one of the founding 
fathers of law and economics and one of the great, innovative, and con-
tinuously surprising legal minds of our day47—as a prophecy coming 
true,48 Holmes’s essay placed a great number of the core treats of the 
coming legal evolution before his readers’ eyes—over 110 years ago. 
Where Holmes pointed to the rising significance of science and 
economics for the theory and practice of law,49 the ensuing legal evolu-
                                                
 45. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 478 (1897) [here-
inafter Holmes, The Path of the Law]; see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, On Receiving the De-
gree of Doctor of Laws, Yale University Commencement (June 30, 1886), in COLLECTED LEGAL 
PAPERS 33 (1920) (“The power of honor to bind men’s lives is not less now than it was in the Middle 
Ages. Now as then it is the breath of our nostrils; it is that for which we live, for which, if need be, 
we are willing to die. It is that which makes the man whose gift is the power to gain riches sacrifice 
health and even life to the pursuit. It is that which makes the scholar feel that he cannot afford to be 
rich.”). 
 46. Holmes, The Path of the Law, supra note 45. 
 47. “And suppose no corporation had ever been punished for violating customary international 
law. There is always a first time for litigation to enforce a norm; there has to be.” Flomo v. Firestone 
Nat’l Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 48. Richard A. Posner, The Path Away from the Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1039, 1043 (1997). 
 49. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL 
PAPERS, supra note 45, at 210: 
A hundred years ago men explained any part of the universe by showing its fitness for 
certain ends, and demonstrating what they conceived to be its final cause according to a 
providential scheme. In our less theological and more scientific day, we explain an object 
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tion proved him right. What sets the present apart from the past, howev-
er, is that precisely this transformation of legal science into its present-
day conundrical mixture of legal theory and philosophy, regulatory theo-
ry or “governance,”50 and economic theory51 not only goes beyond the 
initially sketched parameters but also fundamentally undermines a view 
that would conceive of law as of a field and its neighbor disciplines.52 
“The centre cannot hold”53—law’s autonomous status within a densely 
structured context of social order theories is undermined, already by 
Holmes himself, by exposing it to a complex set of questions touching on 
the nature, function, and form of law. These questions eventually chal-
lenge the boundaries between law and non-law. And this precisely 
proved to be the aftermath and legacy of Holmes’s and his colleagues’ 
anti-formalist attack: a powerful engagement with the assumptions, theo-
ries, and policies of legal argument.54 
This context provides promising, if not intimidating, entry points 
for law’s engagement with itself and all that it might, and might not, be. 
Lawyers like Holmes were well-aware of the vulnerability of the edifice 
of norms, court rooms, and law school curricula long before the advent 
of globalization, the much lamented exhaustion of the state’s regulatory 
capacities,55 and the legal system’s increased generation of “regulatory 
laws,” which due to their complex nature raise particular compliance 
challenges.56 With this in mind, we must remain aware of the continuous-
                                                                                                         
by tracing the order and process of its growth and development from a starting point as-
sumed as given. 
 50. Arguably, the new paradigm in administrative sciences. See, e.g., PHILIPPE MOREAU 
DEFARGES, LA GOUVERNANCE [GOVERNANCE] (2008); Claudio Franzius, Governance und Rege-
lungsstrukturen, 97 VERWALTUNGSARCHIV [ADMINISTRATIVE ARCHIVE] 186 (2006); Oliver E. 
Williamson, The Economics of Governance, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (2005). For a paradigm adopted 
on both the national and the global level, see THOMAS HALE & DAVID HELD, HANDBOOK OF 
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE (2011); HELMUT WILLKE, SMART GOVERNANCE: GOVERNING THE 
GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY (2007); Fleur E. Johns, Global Governance: An Heretical History 
Play, 4 GLOBAL JURIST ADVANCES Art. 3 (2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=603232; and 
Peer Zumbansen, Governance: An Interdisciplinary Perspective, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON 
GOVERNANCE (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012). 
 51. See John Oberdiek, Philosophical Issues in Tort Law, 3 PHILOSOPHY COMPASS 734 (2008); 
Oliver Williamson, The Lens of Contract: Private Ordering, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 438 (2002). 
 52. See, e.g., DIETER GRIMM, RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT UND NACHBARWISSENSCHAFTEN [LAW 
AND NEIGHBORING SCIENCES] (1976). 
 53. William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming (1920). 
 54. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT (1975); 
Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 
(1935); Roscoe Pound, The Call for a “Realist” Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931); Ros-
coe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910). 
 55. See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (Oceana 
Publ’ns 1950) (1930). 
 56. See Kristin E. Hickman & Claire A. Hill, Concepts, Categories, and Compliance in the 
Regulatory State, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1151, 1159–74 (2010). “[R]egulatory laws tend to differ from 
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ly mounted challenges of law’s empire, as they are promulgated by 
economists,57 sociologists,58 geographers,59 or anthropologists,60 just to 
name a few of the disciplines with a keen interest in law as a governance 
tool.61 To reflect on the origins of interdisciplinary thinking of and 
around law, as it pertains to the corporation, is especially crucial at a 
time when scientific advances propel a rapidly growing knowledge base 
concerning just about anything connected to legal reasoning. This 
knowledge environment creates the potential for the ubiquitous excite-
ment about a new “Law and . . . ,”62 having an almost overwhelming ef-
fect on us regarding an awareness and appreciation of much older en-
gagements with law’s interdisciplinary foundations. 
The current interest in law’s psychological63 and behavioral eco-
nomic64 dimensions gives the indisputable triumph of law and economics 
over other law and society movements yet another twist. This triumph 
implicates important consequences for our understanding of the embed-
dedness of law in a rich context of theoretical and empirical studies of 
human—individual and collective65—and institutional behavior.66 The 
dialogue between economics, sociology,67 and evolutionary theory68 has 
                                                                                                         
other types of law in the complexity of both their subject matter and the programs they establish.” Id. 
at 1174. 
 57. See AVINASH K. DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE MODES OF 
GOVERNANCE (2004). 
 58. See Saskia Sassen, The State and Economic Globalization: Any Implications for Interna-
tional Law?, 1 U. CHI. J. INT’L L. 109 (2000). 
 59. See David Harvey, The Sociological and Geographical Imaginations, 18 INT’L J. POL., 
CULTURE & SOC’Y 211 (2005). 
 60. See Sally Engle Merry, Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights, and Global Gov-
ernance, 52 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY S83 (2011). 
 61. For a discussion, see Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking 
on the Technicalities, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 973 (2005); see also Peer Zumbansen, Governance: An 
Interdisciplinary Perspective, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON GOVERNANCE, supra note 50.  
 62. See, e.g., the scholars and related specialized programs ranging from Law and Psychology, 
http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/degrees/joint/psychology/; Law and Geography, http://www 
.sfu.ca/~blomley/research.html; Law and Biology, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/22 
16; Law and Ethics, http://www.trinity.utoronto.ca/Current_Students/esl.htm; to Law and Science, 
http://web.mit.edu/~ssilbey/www/pdf/Silbey_I_fnl.pdf. 
 63. See, e.g., the brilliant work by Ruth Aguilera and others, supra notes 34 and 36. 
 64. See BEHAVIOURAL LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). 
 65. See LAW AND HAPPINESS (Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein eds., 2010). 
 66. See Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian & Francesco Trebbit, Institutions Rule: The Prima-
cy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development, 9 J. ECON. GROWTH 
131 (2004); see also DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE (1990). 
 67. See, e.g., DIRK BAECKER, WIRTSCHAFTSSOZIOLOGIE [ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY] (2006); 
Victor Nee & Richard Swedberg, Economic Sociology and New Institutional Economics, in 
HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 789 (Claude Ménard & Mary Shirley eds., 2005). 
 68. See RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF 
ECONOMIC CHANGE (1985); Peer Zumbansen & Gralf-Peter Calliess, Law, Economics, and Evolu-
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considerable roots, giving rise to a number of very promising research 
avenues, altogether fostering a more expansive and interdisciplinary in-
terest in norm-creation69 and societal ordering.70 Building on, but going 
beyond the Legal Realists’ attack of the impenetrable judicial mindset,71 
law and psychology scholars and behavioral economists have more re-
cently taken toward a better understanding of the motivational forces 
behind legal and wider social decision-making.72 
What insights should we as corporate law scholars, and as legal 
scholars more generally, begin to draw from these suggestions? In order 
to begin to unpack the interdisciplinary promise for a better understand-
ing of law today, the picture needs to be more accentuated. Lawyers in 
different areas such as, but not limited to, criminal law, tort law, constitu-
tional law, and international law73 have long been addressing structures 
and effects of (for example) collective human behavior. At the basis of 
such engagement has been the recognition that the attribution of different 
legally scrutinizable forms of guilt, responsibility, accountability, or—in 
international law—authority74 requires a particular legal theoretical effort 
to address incomplete or inchoate chains of causation. Early on, lawyers 
recognized that in order to make sense of the intertwined nature of indi-
vidual and collective behavior either in extreme circumstances75 or in 
organizational corporate contexts,76 they would have to expand tradition-
al legal categories. 
Additionally, the work in organizational psychology and behavioral 
economics, which scholars have brought to bear on corporate governance 
with increasing intensity,77 has a number of further applications that de-
                                                                                                         
tionary Theory: State of the Art and Interdisciplinary Perspectives, LAW, ECONOMICS AND 
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 1 (Peer Zumbansen & Gralf-Peter Calliess eds., 2011). 
 69. See NORMS AND THE LAW (John N. Drobak ed., 2006); Richard A. Posner, Social Norms, 
Social Meaning, and Economic Analysis of Law: A Comment, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 553 (1998); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).   
 70. See Elinor Ostrom, Challenges and Growth: The Development of the Interdisciplinary 
Field of Institutional Analysis, 3 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 239 (2007). 
 71. See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908). 
 72. E.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE. IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
 73. E.g., Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law and Social Movements: Challenges of 
Theorizing Resistance, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 397 (2003). 
 74. See Christoph Schreuer, The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for 
International Law?, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 447 (1993). 
 75. See CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING, ORDINARY MEN: RESERVE POLICE BATTALION 101 AND 
THE FINAL SOLUTION IN POLAND (1992). 
 76. See Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. Ltd. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 662 (Can.). 
 77. See, e.g., CHESTER BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE (1938); CHESTER 
BARNARD, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION (1982); THOMAS DONALDSON, CORPORATIONS AND MORALITY (1982); HERBERT 
SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (1947); Aguilera, Rupp, Williams & Ganapathi, supra note 34; 
2012] The Corporation as a Governance Object 1283 
serve our attention. The applications become apparent when we return to 
the earlier projects undertaken primarily by law and society scholars with 
the aim of rendering a more complete picture of the embeddedness of 
legal regulation in heterogeneous normative and institutional settings. 
Groundbreaking work in that regard was carried out, for example, in the 
area of contract law.78 Lawyers,79 legal pluralists,80 and sociologists81 
were among those who pointed to the myriad forms in which informal 
norms governed behavior in far more subtle and sophisticated ways than 
a formalistic legal model would imply. Standing on the shoulders of le-
gal-sociological scholars who explored the interaction between formal 
and informal order systems,82 legal theorists were able to draw an im-
pressively more layered and differentiated picture of “contracts in ac-
tion.”83 
These evolutionary steps are important to keep in mind today when 
we learn that a new breed of “social norms theorists” harbor deep scepti-
cism vis-à-vis allegedly incompetent or overzealous judges who adjudi-
cate complex contractual arrangements.84 In fact, serious attempts to 
make sense of the formal/informal regulatory environment, which char-
acterized, shaped, and informed contractual governance, had been under-
taken. And such attempts had not only been based on extensive empirical 
research but also had been carried out with particular scrutiny of the eco-
nomic dimensions of these regulatory patterns.85 Research on these fronts 
resulted in, among other insights, a growing awareness of the layers of 
contractual bargaining that could not fully be explained by reference to 
                                                                                                         
Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead 
Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1997). 
 78. See Stewart Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the Complexities of Con-
tract, 11 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 507 (1977). 
 79. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The 
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). 
 80. See Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Field as an Appro-
priate Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 719 (1973). 
 81. See Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360 (1973). 
 82. See EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (Russell & 
Russell 1962) (originally published in German as GRUNDLEGUNG DER SOZIOLOGIE DES RECHTS in 
1913); GEORGES GURVITCH, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (Routledge and Kegan Paul 1947) (originally 
published in French as PROBLÈMES DE LA SOCIOLOGIE DU DROIT). 
 83. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 
AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963). For further discussion, see the landmark casebook by STEWART 
MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION (1995). 
 84. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 156 (2000); Robert E. Scott, The Death of 
Contract Law, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 369 (2004). 
 85. See, e.g., David Campbell, The Incompleteness of our Understanding of the Law and Eco-
nomics of Relational Contract, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 645; Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of 
Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 
NW. U. L. REV. 854 (1978); Zumbansen, supra note 5. 
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either the (subjective) will of the parties or to an established (objective) 
purpose dimension of the arrangement. Instead, an economic sociology 
and empirical legal studies approach taken to the scrutiny of contractual 
arrangements revealed both long-term86 as well as organizational87 di-
mensions that prompted a fundamental reconsideration of the confines of 
a contractual agreement.88 This shift in perspective eventually gave way 
to an increasingly differentiated understanding of the adaptive and, argu-
ably, constitutionalizing dimensions of contract.89 
IV. THE PROMISES (AND PITFALLS) OF CONTRACT GOVERNANCE 
Today, the “materialization of contract law”90 has a sour ring to it 
because even stern adepts of consumer protection law have grown aware 
of the intricacies of judicial engagements with fast-evolving, sensible 
areas of social organization.91 In response, contract theorists have begun 
to turn their curious minds to an even more layered analysis of contractu-
al governance, both with regard to a political critique of power relations92 
and a better understanding of contractual networks.93 
These developments are crucial elements in the formation of a new 
regulatory landscape, which can be described neither with reference to 
the state as sole law-producer nor with reference alone to legal rules 
                                                
 86. Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and What We Do Not Know, 1985 WIS. 
L. REV. 483. 
 87. CONTRACT AND ORGANISATION, supra note 20.  
 88. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the Waning 
of Consent, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 189 (Omri Ben-Shahar 
ed., 2007). 
 89. See Rudolf Wiethölter, Privatrecht als Gesellschaftstheorie?[Private Law as Theory of 
Society?], in FUNKTIONSWANDEL DER PRIVATRECHTSINSTITUTIONEN [TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FUNCTIONS OF PRIVATE LAW INSTITUTIONS] 645 (Fritz Baur et al. eds., 1974); see also Karl Llewel-
lyn, What Price Contract? An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704 (1930). 
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(Agnes Schwarzschild trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul 1949) (1929); MAX WEBER, ON LAW IN 
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DER DEUTSCHEN ENTWICKLUNG [A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE WITH PARTICULAR 
REFERENCE TO GERMANY] (1967). 
 91. See REINHARD DAMM, Privatautonomie und Verbraucherschutz, Legalstruktur und Re-
alstruktur von Autonomiekonzepten [Private Autonomy and Consumer Protection: Legal and Real 
Structure of Concepts of Autonomy], 50 VERSICHERUNGSRECHT [INSURANCE LAW] 129 (1999). 
 92. See Roy Kreitner, Frameworks of Cooperation: Competing, Conflicting, and Joined Inter-
ests in Contract and its Surroundings, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 59 (2005). 
 93. See Marc Amstutz, The Constitution of Contractual Networks, in NETWORKS: LEGAL 
ISSUES OF MULTILATERAL CO-OPERATION 309 (Marc Amstutz & Gunther Teubner eds., 2009); 
GUNTHER TEUBNER, NETWORKS AS CONNECTED CONTRACTS (Hugh Collins ed., 2011); Stefan 
Grundmann, Die Dogmatik der Vertragsnetze [The Legal Dogmatics of Contractual Networks], 207 
ARCHIV FÜR DIE CILIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS [ARCHIVE OF CIVIL LAW PRACTICE] 718 (2007). 
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when we attempt to depict present and emerging regulatory structures.94 
It should be against this background and in light of legal scholars’ at-
tempts to make sense of the legal-sociological, legal-pluralist, and evolu-
tionary theories, as well as prospects of an emerging transnational nor-
mative order95 that we continue to posit the project of “contract govern-
ance”96 vis-à-vis complementing bodies of theory interested in social 
ordering. Scholars addressing a confrontation between legal and non-
legal approaches to contract governance should be mindful of the ques-
tionability of law’s boundaries as such—today as in the past. As Holmes 
said: 
It is perfectly proper to regard and study the law simply as a great 
anthropological document. It is proper to resort to it to discover 
what ideals of society have been strong enough to reach that final 
stage of expression, or what have been the changes in dominant ide-
als from century to century. It is proper to study it as an exercise in 
the morphology and transformation of human ideas. The study pur-
sued for such ends becomes science in the strictest sense.97 
Contract governance comes onto the scene with considerable bag-
gage; baggage we need to study closely to unpack the continued promi-
nence that contractarian thinking enjoys in the field of corporate govern-
ance. The layered inheritance of contract governance expresses itself in 
the triple dimension of contract governance itself, which can mean that 
contracts govern, or that we are concerned with the governance of con-
tracts, or with the governance of contracts that govern.98 Traditional law 
and economics scholars would likely embrace the governing function of 
contracts, while progressive lawyers interested in the materialization of 
                                                
 94. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Towards a Legal Theory of Supranationality – The Viability of the 
Network Concept, 3 EUR. L.J. 33 (1997). For a discussion of transnational private law, see GRALF-
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quiry 500 (2012) [with an extensive discussion of CALLIESS & ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS, 
note 94] 
 96. See Riesenhuber & Möslein, supra note 2.  
 97. HOLMES, supra note 49, at 212. 
 98. This last dimension connects contract governance and contract theory with what adminis-
trative, and more particularly, environmental lawyers have learned to address from the perspective of 
regulatory theory. Here, the focus is in particular on reflexive forms of governmental intervention. 
See, e.g., Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (1995). For additional 
background, see Power, supra note 37.  
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law99 would tend to focus on the scope of adjudication and judge-made 
contract law, captured in the governance of contracts.100 Contract gov-
ernance, understood as a conceptual framework, is an ingenious proposi-
tion as an intellectual undertaking and as a research enterprise because it 
naturally captures both of these dimensions. Because of this capture it is 
possible to see the inside and the outside of contract governance, which 
illustrates the complex assumptions that go into the project of “contract 
governance,” as currently pursued, from the start and explains its prom-
ise for a continued depiction of the corporation as a contractual structure. 
But what has forcefully been shown in the interpretation of the business 
corporation as a nexus of contracts101 can just as aptly be applied to the 
idea of contract governance itself. In both corporate governance and in 
contract governance, the construction of a complex governance architec-
ture on contract as a self-explanatory and auto-legitimizing principle de-
taches the contract from its legal-regulatory context by associating it with 
a sphere distinct from the state and regulatory “intervention.” Such an 
un-ironic rendering of contract governance understood as governance by 
contract “invisibilizes” the “basis of contract”102 and hereby continues to 
ignore the scathing critique offered by Holmes in 1905.103 
This isolating depiction of contract governance as autonomous from 
other, allegedly state-based forms of lawmaking and regulatory govern-
ance repeats what a number of law and economics scholars have been 
arguing regarding the autonomy of so-called “social norms.” Scholars 
identify and herald social norms as the glue of highly differentiated, 
modern market societies whose complexity renders any attempt by the 
state’s regulatory apparatus and the judiciary futile.104 
There is, certainly, another reading of the idea of contract govern-
ance that depicts it as a comprehensive societal ordering framework.105 
This reading would hope to undo the “discovery of social norms by law 
and economics” scholars 106 in order to appreciate the concept of contrac-
tual governance as part of a comprehensive theory of contract in a liberal 
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society.107 Pondering the embeddedness of contract governance in a 
framework of both institutional and normative reference points ensures 
that the connection between society and the practice (and theory) of con-
tracting is never left out of sight. That connection is severed when one 
plays contract governance off against the governance of contract, as is 
done by social norms theorists and proponents of a neo-formalist ap-
proach to contract law.108 In contrast, the genius of contract governance 
has always been the recognition that these two dimensions cannot be 
separated in a way that one would potentially trump the other. To do so 
would render absurd the fact that contracting is part of societal interac-
tion. To recognize contractual governance (as governance through con-
tract) as part of society, however, connects the theory of contract govern-
ance with the theory of society. And the latter is far too complex to be 
captured in the scrutiny of this or that instance, where courts wandered 
into the judicial resolution of complex contractual relationships. 
Contract governance cannot be reduced to a theory of social norms 
independent from the theory of society in which it is embedded. This 
theory, however, is not fully accessible for the law itself, as it has its own 
legal rhymes and reasons. But the differentiation of the legal system oc-
curs as the law reacts to the world over time. In doing so, it receives im-
pulses from economics, politics, and religion that perturbate, impregnate, 
and challenge the law and its toolkit. 
V. COMING FULL CIRCLE? THE CORPORATION AND 
CONTRACT GOVERNANCE 
For lawyers, taking on economics—either in the way economists 
engage with psychology and behavioral sciences or in the way econo-
mists continue to push our imagination to better understand the nature of 
institutions109 and norms110—can be fruitful. The lawyers’ task highlights 
that legal theoretical analysis of corporate governance is a complex en-
terprise. 
The promise lies in connecting social norms theory, new institu-
tional economics, behavioral economics, and evolutionary theory with 
the law’s earlier engagement with sociology111 and political theory112 in 
                                                
 107. COLLINS, supra note 5, at 3–4.  
 108. See Scott, supra note 84. 
 109. See NORTH, supra note 66; DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF 
ECONOMIC CHANGE (2005). 
 110. For a poignant assessment, see David Charny, Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: 
“Norms” in Contractual Relationships, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1841 (1996). 
 111. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (W. D. Halls trans., Free 
Press 1984) (1893); MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT (W. D. Halls trans., 1990); WEBER, supra note 90. 
1288 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 35:1269 
order to unfold the true potential of a historically evolving interdiscipli-
nary exploration of this area of law and corresponding social, economic, 
and political theory. Such “connecting” cannot simply mean to build on 
earlier findings by stacking newer trends of “interdisciplinary” studies (à 
la ‘law and . . .’) onto new ones.113 Instead, a connection must take into 
account the yet-unfulfilled promise of these longstanding endeavors to 
deconstruct, unpack, and lay bare the unquestioned assumptions and ho-
lisms of theories such as (economic) efficiency,114 market freedom,115 or 
theories about “the corporation.”116 This enterprise could potentially have 
a further reach but is likely to be complemented by a larger set of chal-
lenges arising from the diversity of materials, questions of method, and 
avenues of conceptualization than we are accustomed to in the ordinary 
law and economics approach to corporate law.117 
The remainder of this Article is an attempt to draw on the insights 
from the preceding discussions pertaining to corporate governance and 
the emerging research into contract governance. Central to the following 
undertaking is a revisiting of the scholarship and theory regarding “rela-
tional contracting.” In order to assess whether and to what degree rela-
tional contract theory might offer helpful insights for an alternative con-
tractualist theory of the firm, it will be necessary to review once more the 
theoretical underpinnings of the contractualist theory of the firm, which 
has dominated corporate governance debate over the past decades. In that 
regard, the first part of the following section will critically explore the 
individualistic assumptions that inform the dominant theory of the firm. 
In a second step, it will be necessary to restate the methodological un-
derpinnings of relational contract theory, before engaging with the well-
known critiques leveled against that theory. 
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A. The Conundrum of Agency in Contemporary Contract 
and Corporate Theory 
The caveat in order here originates from the implicitly individualis-
tic assumptions that appear to inform some of the current interest in be-
havioral economics but that also underlie other law and economics ap-
proaches—for example, lawyers’ engagement with game theory.118 The 
focus on individual or collective (again seen as divisible into separate 
actors) behavioral patterns suggests that there is still a widely held belief 
in the possibility of tracing results back to choices, regardless of how 
irrational these choices might be. Contrast this assumption with the les-
sons from the financial crisis. 
The crisis illustrates the shortcomings of governance and interven-
tion theories that are oriented around linear cause-effect and responsive-
ness relations between problem and solution.119 Indeed, if we consider 
the current research into the origins and causes of the financial crisis, we 
find that the analytical regulatory theory toolkits of cause-effect relations 
as well as market-state distinctions120 are at odds with the more systemic 
roots of the crisis. The consequences of this shift in perspective, howev-
er, are still far from clear. But what is emerging is a need to seriously 
reflect on regulation as the basis of recognizing complex systemic 
boundaries, spheres, and co-dynamics. Then, on the basis that there is a 
fundamental inability to fully translate rationalities of one system—law, 
economics, politics, religion, etc.—into another, one would more ade-
quately understand how regulatory approaches that aim to universalize 
the rationality of one system by imposing them on others are bound to 
fail. 
This can be illustrated by taking the example of law as a social sys-
tem: “Legal forms encode information about coordination strategies 
which have proved more or less successful in particular social settings, 
including the economic domains of the market and the business enter-
prise.”121 This does not mean that the economic system is able to either 
incorporate, let alone understand, this particular approach to the framing 
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of coordination strategies within its own reference system, nor that this 
would work the other way around. Law and economics, as an engage-
ment between both systems, is too often presented as being able to draw 
on shared concerns about efficiency, costs, externalities, or of course, 
rights.122 Surely, however, each means different things to this or that sys-
tem.123 
As a result, contract governance offers a welcome opportunity to 
reach out but also to reach back. This is not novel for lawyers, who are 
known to be constantly laboring on models of law that are developed in 
response to what has been perceived as a heightened complexity of so-
ciety. While this endeavour of formulating legal responses to societal 
problems is too often understood as one that lies within the competence 
area of public lawyers, contract lawyers have continued to claim that 
their field cannot be understood in separation from an encompassing un-
derstanding and theorizing of social complexity.124 The emerging re-
search field of contract governance promises to shed some new light125 
on the interaction and overlap between contractual and organizational 
governance dynamics by exploring the governance function of contract 
and corporate law as parallel regulatory paradigms, tightly interwoven in 
the face of highly volatile markets.126 
Contract and corporate law need to be understood as being ade-
quately “open” to allow for taking on board the specific contextual par-
ticularities that characterize contract governance. The need is particularly 
acute when the function of contract governance consists of dealing with 
complexity, as with various forms of risk. The focus on risks that need to 
be managed by corporate managers—rather than the common interest in 
conceptualizing management’s or the corporation’s “responsibility”—is 
of crucial importance in a new assessment of what we should actually 
understand as directors’ responsibilities, on the one hand, and the availa-
bility of defenses on the other. But in light of an evolving jurisprudence 
on business judgment and entire fairness, what would this mean con-
cretely? One way of going forward would be to use the framework and 
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concept of contract governance to reach beyond the oppositional poles 
that characterize principal-agent relations within the corporation. Where-
as contract thinking within the corporation is too often pitted against al-
legedly undue state intervention, a more differentiated model of contract 
governance would allow us to take the analysis to the next level. For 
such a model, it is necessary to return briefly to the well-known tension 
between classical and relational contracts. 
B. Beyond Public versus Private: The Promise of Relational Contract 
Theory for a New Theory of the Firm 
Relational contracting depicts complex contractual arrangements 
over time in order to allow for a more adequate description of the combi-
nation of contract, bargain, organization, amendment, and adaptation that 
characterize numerous contractual business relations today.127 Far from 
depicting anything “cosy” or “familial” in those relations,128 relational 
contract theory was primarily interested in developing a more adequate 
rendering of the existing contractual governance practice in multi-polar, 
time-extended business settings. 
The need for providing context for the assumptions and arguments 
of relational contract theory and social norms theory exists because of 
the apparent proximity of the two theories. Relational contracting exists 
in private market contexts and in public-private regulatory and collabora-
tion contexts; it is the transformation of the surrounding regulatory land-
scape toward further decentralization and proceduralization that prompts 
a renewed interest in exploring the “public dimension” of such contrac-
tual arrangements.129 The qualification of a contract as “public” in infra-
structure maintenance or service delivery, which was formerly governed 
and carried out under the auspices of the state, is less contentious than a 
depiction of long-term contractual arrangements with built-in or associ-
ated amendment and adaptation capabilities as public. It is more conten-
tious because of the difference in context and the consequences of attrib-
uting “public” qualities to a contractual arrangement commonly per-
ceived as being of a private nature. The corporation springs to mind as 
the definitive example—at least from the mainstream perspective. To 
qualify contractual relations inside or outside of the corporation as public 
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and to base such a qualification on assertions of particular dimensions of 
responsibility or accountability short-circuits the attempt to unpack the 
concept of relational contract within the corporation by reformulating the 
nature of the firm through a comprehensive theory of corporate social 
responsibility. 
Does this thought experiment already spell the end for the attempt 
to bring relational contract thinking into the ambit of the corporation? Is 
this equal to the touching of the third rail? A possible solution might be 
found if we returned to the initial impetus that led us to undertake a par-
allel study of contract governance and corporate governance. A driving 
idea at the basis of this project is the concern with the conceptual short-
comings of the dominant “theories of the firm.” Referenced as either 
shareholder or stakeholder theories respectively, we regularly find the 
construction of two diametrically opposed explanatory frameworks, nei-
ther of which is sufficiently sophisticated to provide a satisfying answer 
to most of the conflicts arising inside and outside of a corporation. We 
find an under-theorized concept of contract governance, a concept that 
basically operates with the most rudimentary assertion of contractual 
bargaining. Conversely, we find assertions of an organization, holistic in 
nature, implausibly overburdened with just about any social, political, or 
public concern one would wish to place on the shoulders of the next best 
“powerful company.” 
The lesson to be learned from relational contracting is in fact within 
reach. Rather than merely pitting long-term contracting and adaptation 
arrangements against one-off exchange contracts, it would seem much 
more promising to return to the idea of relational contracting from a 
methodological perspective. This means that relational contracting is to 
be understood as a governance framework (albeit with loopholes and 
reasons for contestation)130 for complex interactional arrangements, but 
at the same time, relational contracting, perhaps better than canonical 
corporate law doctrine, allows us to incorporate contextual evidence into 
our governance of the contracts at issue. The example of fiduciary duties 
illustrates this point. When we (used to) force reified conceptions of the 
purpose of the corporation into the demarcations of a duty of loyalty,131 
the only viable response is a choice between regulation and deference to 
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business judgment.132 When, however, we stress the idea of the corpora-
tion as a web of interlocking and overlapping contracts beyond the basic 
assertion of a “nexus of contracts,” it becomes possible to perceive of the 
now more fully visible contractual arrangements throughout and beyond 
the corporation as representations of a highly differentiated governance 
network. 
The difference between this contractual-network concept and the 
otherwise dominant, if still slightly incoherent model of the contractual 
corporation,133 is that this conception forces us to more adequately con-
sider the context in which the contractual arrangement is situated. This 
context is characterized by a deep and fundamental transformation of 
public accountability and sovereign stature regarding the creation, deliv-
ery, and maintenance of services that are widely perceived as pertaining 
to the common good; in other words, the large-scale transformation, if 
not the erosion, of the (Western) welfare state.134 This has important con-
sequences for our engagement with the corporation as a target and site of 
regulatory governance. As it becomes increasingly difficult to offset the 
allegedly private nature of the corporation against the “public” nature of 
regulation and intervention, an implied understanding of allegedly public 
or private dimensions of the contracts entered into by different parties 
inside and outside of the corporation cannot govern the opposition of 
different interests within the corporation. Instead, a different set of cate-
gorizations must ensue, which must guide the interpretation of contractu-
al rights. While there is not sufficient space here to elaborate this more 
fully,135 the broader scope of such categories can already be sketched. 
The crucial element in the recontractualization of the corporation 
lies in the new understanding of the contractual relations between differ-
ent “stakeholders” in and around the corporation. From the proposed per-
spective, contracts cannot simply be understood as instantiations of rights 
and duties creating relations between different stakeholders. Instead, the 
perspective moves away from an individualistic perception of the end-
points of the contractual relations toward a more systematic understand-
ing. Whereas now, the endpoints of all contracts within the corporation 
are identifiable with particular positions, carriers of interests, and differ-
ent degrees of power, an alternative understanding would insist on ex-
panding the scope of this identification so that the context of the as-
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sumed, defended, and mobilized bargaining positions can be considered. 
This would lead to an enriched understanding of the different contracting 
parties. The enrichment would go not only significantly beyond diamet-
rical opposition between owners and managers but also beyond that be-
tween investors and employees. If the identification of a contract’s end-
point allowed for an illumination of the larger context and framework 
within which someone entered into and assumed a particular contracting 
position, it would become possible to take the contract’s, and with that 
the corporation’s, context and environment into consideration. The ex-
panded consideration can then be incorporated in identifying who is at 
the respective ends of contractual relations within the corporation. 
C. The Many Bases of Contracts136 
One could argue that this might result in a similar overburdening of 
contractual relations that already characterized the theoretical policy pro-
posals put forward by first and second generation consumer protection 
law scholars.137 The difference between both approaches, however, is 
already the different “moment in time.” Today’s attempts to develop a 
protective framework of consumer rights can build on a far more 
acknowledged policy framework supporting its underlying cause,138 but 
consumer law advocates now operate in a far more decentralized and 
volatile institutional and normative environment.139 This constellation 
suggests some structural similarity between the conditions of private 
contracting in the area of consumer goods, as well as (formerly public) 
services and provisions on a global scale and intra-corporate contracting. 
The interests represented by those at the endpoints of the respective con-
tracts are different today than they used to be. With a fundamental shift 
in the public and private provision of basic needs security, social insur-
ance, and old age security guarantees, the association of contracts with 
the “market” or the “state” in order to delineate scope and extension of 
rights and responsibilities is no longer an option. Seeing relations within 
the corporation through a contractual lens allows for a better appreciation 
of the context out of which a contract arose. 
This empowerment, however, is not only associated with tradition-
ally weak parties in the corporate governance regime such as employees, 
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creditors, the environment, and society at large, but instead, this empow-
erment is also felt at all endpoints of the contractual-network structure. 
Directors would hereby be given a far greater opportunity to have their 
position within the firm recognized and scrutinized well beyond the rou-
tine assertions of a director discharging the duty of loyalty. 
There are two reasons, then, why we should not so directly embrace 
the idea of empowerment. The first reason follows from an appreciation 
of the fallacies of romanticizing private relations without taking into ac-
count the power relations that inform and shape the levels of freedom 
available to the different participants in a private regulatory regime.140 
While consumer protection law went some way in indicating regulatory 
responses to the problems of bargaining asymmetry, we now find our-
selves often confronted with a much more complex, multi-polar contrac-
tual setting, which is not as easily amenable to a “weak” versus “strong” 
party assessment as would perhaps have been the case in differently 
structured contractual arrangements. Second, comparison with earlier 
forms of consumer law is inappropriate because of the altered regulatory 
landscape. Whereas before the law around consumer contracts had to 
keep an eye on both national and (some) international legislation, as well 
as case law, today’s consumer law is an extremely fluid mixed body of 
norms. Some of these norms emerged from traditional state-based 
sources, while others do not stem from traditional lawmakers. They both 
emerge from and contribute to the evolution of a volatile, transnational 
regulatory regime.141 The same can be said for corporate law, which has 
long been a fundamentally transnational regulatory field; the hybrid na-
ture of actors, norms, and processes makes corporate law a very promis-
ing area for legal-sociological and legal-pluralist analysis. 
Consumer protection law has illustrated the political dimensions of 
negotiating the adequate relationship between private autonomy and state 
intervention just as powerfully as the debate around the convergence or 
divergence of corporate governance models. Against this background, 
politics still very clearly matter in the continuously unfolding research 
agenda around contract and corporate governance, but the term “politics” 
on its own hardly contributes to a further refinement of the fields as per-
tinent governance fields. What is “political” about contract governance, 
just as it is about corporate governance or about the regulation of labor 
markets, is anything but an identifiable selection of different interests or 
even stakeholders. The fallacy of methodological individualism turns out 
to trigger highly undesirable consequences, as it falls dramatically short 
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of capturing the complexity that ties contracts, corporations, and labor 
markets together. To study this complex landscape, we must develop a 
methodology that appreciates the fundamental differences in systems’ 
description and construction of the world in order to imagine a non-
unifying, pluralist approach to making sense of governance, regulation, 
and of the “and” in law and economics. 
It follows that an enhanced interdisciplinary study of the non-
contractual “foundations” of contracting cannot stop at the sociological 
analysis of how and between whom promises are made and how they are 
implemented, enforced, and institutionalized. As we have seen, we must 
take into account as relevant the individual and collective disposition of 
market actors and the larger patterns and mechanisms of information 
transmission, such as those that lead to changes in stock markets.142 The 
cautionary tale here, particularly for the legal and economic scholars who 
have recently begun to embrace “social norms” and institutional econom-
ics as the foundation of a social theory of regulation, is that to focus on 
just this side of market behavior might too easily provide a platform for a 
one-sided and de-contextual focus on “what people do.” One risk with 
such a behavioral analysis, disembedded from the larger societal context 
in which human behavior occurs, is that we cut the ties between 
longstanding sociological research into societal change and our present 
interest in contracts as prime modes of governance. Further, we risk se-
verely underestimating the nature of the norms we are referring to under 
the umbrella of “social norms.” 
Building on legal sociology and legal pluralism on the one hand, 
and on new institutional economics on the other, will go some way to-
ward a more differentiated understanding of norms in the evolving com-
plex regulatory landscape that characterizes the interaction of public, 
private, state-originating, and non-state informal norms today. But even 
that approach would have to more seriously consider different alternative 
types and shapes of norms: cultural, symbolic, or in other ways non-
legal. A more suitable methodological approach would attempt to see 
beyond and between individual motivations, beliefs, or rationales that 
drive behavior in order to overcome the focus either on market versus 
non-market spheres or the breaking up of a complex environment into 
different interests. 
To reiterate the context in which our current investigations are em-
bedded, if complexity is one (if not the crucial) determinative challenge 
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facing any attempt at formulating regulatory responses to situations of 
crisis (such as those sought in response to the current financial crisis, but 
not limited to this moment in time), then it is important to acknowledge 
the core trait of complexity and recognize that it cannot be broken down 
into or explained through its constituent parts.143 Rather than trying to 
devise a meta-code oriented around a particular central or dominating 
goal or value, regulation will have to take into account the need to devise 
a process that appreciates the different functional rationalities at work 
within a particular regulatory problem. Such an approach would include 
a fundamental shift from normative to cognitive expectations in the 
structure and the understanding of regulatory processes.144 While this 
approach was made with particular reference to the challenges facing 
legal theory in the context of a fragmented global legal order,145 it force-
fully applies to the current conundrum of financial regulation as much as 
it does to the fields of contract governance146 and corporate governance. 
The latter areas constitute formidable examples of complex regulatory 
arenas in that they each defy categorizations along traditional forms of 
political versus non-political, state versus non-state, and public versus 
private regulation. 
Both areas are public and private at the same time—and more. In 
addition, they are neither national nor international, neither formal nor 
informal. Our distinctions can go only so far in illuminating the compo-
nent structure of financial regulation or contract governance. The exhaus-
tion of these distinctions illustrates the inadequacy of trying to associate 
governance processes with structures of either “regulation” or “self-
regulation.” This association would make sense only if the boundaries 
demarcated self-standing structures of norm generation and implementa-
tion. That is not the case; we base our distinction in the end on the appre-
ciation of a particular level of deference or “autonomy.” In the case of 
regulation, this ordinarily depicts the state as having the choice to inter-
vene or not to intervene. By contrast, “self-regulation” depicts actors—
individual or institutional—as exercising norm-generating authority on 
an autonomous basis, that is, free from regulation as intervention. The 
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fragmentary nature of this depiction is not new,147 but beyond the clarifi-
cation of the rights basis of the exercise of authority, there is the problem 
of over-individualizing who in fact is regulating or self-regulating. The 
current attempts to push regulatory theory toward a framework that can 
incorporate systemic linkages148 underline the importance to move be-
yond “interests” and “stakeholders”149 to a more differentiated system of 
“affectedness.”150 This move represents one of the keys to thinking about 
regulation and governance. 
The correlation between an interest in “affectedness” among consti-
tutionalists and democracy theorists cannot render us blind to the “use of 
knowledge in society.” As forcefully demarcated by Friedrich Hayek, the 
analytical emphasis has to be on the adequate locus and the level of 
(self-) regulation. 151 This connection between grass-roots perspectives on 
political legitimacy and the economists’ interest in identifying the best 
level of rule generation is important, as it allows a more encompassing 
appreciation of the regulatory challenges arising in a landscape that dis-
plays increasingly prominent elements of deterritorialized, decentralized, 
and nontraditional forms of legislation.152 Because an economic assess-
ment of the merits of decentralization, as well as regulatory competition 
over harmonization,153 cannot drill deeply enough into issues of represen-
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tation and legitimacy, it is crucial to take noneconomic considerations 
into view that approach the issue through the lens of pluralism and norm 
theory.154 
VI. CONCLUSION 
So, what lessons are we able to draw at this point? The “awesome 
social invention”155 of the large publicly held corporation continues to be 
a focal point of intensive analysis. The study of the corporation necessi-
tates a reflection on the methods and theories with which we approach 
this undertaking. The reflection on corporate governance, contract gov-
ernance, and the interdisciplinary nature of corporate law is an important 
prerequisite for an enhanced understanding of the nature of the corpora-
tion. 
But the continuing investigations into the “nature” of the corpora-
tion show that contractual and organizational models of the corporation 
still inform our thinking about a theory of the firm. The same is true for 
attempts to carve out the definitive private or public nature of the firm. 
Such attempts say more about the concurring efforts in making sense of a 
globalizing, complex society, a society that in the West has been de-
scribed for some time through the demarcations of public and private 
spaces, referring to the state on one hand, and to the market on the other. 
The treacherous nature of such distinctions is well known by now and 
rejected by hardly anyone. What is at stake around the endless rounds of 
contestation and resurrection of these distinctions is what really matters. 
Contracts have been crucial instruments and fora of societal gov-
ernance for a long time. But that has never meant, nor should it today, 
that they can be studied in isolation from the context in which they per-
form regulatory functions. Parties do not simply enter into agreements 
outside or “in the shadow of the law” because they deem it efficient. The 
“turn to contract” occurs in the context of a richly structured field of pub-
lic and private intersecting modes of governance. To celebrate either 
contract or social norms as the (late) expressions of economic liberalism 
will give little guidance to the questions we face today. Economic gov-
ernance must correctly be understood as a call to arms—not against the 
alleged interventionist fervor of zealous governments or activist judges, 
but rather for the building of a comprehensive, interdisciplinary theory of 
(market) governance today. 
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